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Abstract 
This paper presents and discusses SOllie design and security issues surround-
ing electronic strongboxes as an electronic counterpart of physical strongboxes 
typically found in large traditional finallcial institutions. The concept of elec-
tronic strongboxes is briefly discussed, cOlllparing against physical strongboxes. 
A basic system for electronic strongbox('s is then provided and the functional 
and security requirements of the system's components is presented. 
!\-eywords: Electronic Strongboxes, Electrollic Commerce, Payment Systems, Dis-
tributed Systems. 
1 Introduction 
The growth of the Iuternet pushed by the development of user-friendly browsers has 
turned into reality the notion of electronic commerce and business on the Internet. 
The decrease in hardware costs and storage prices in the last few years has increased 
the accessibility of personal computers to the ordinary person on the street. Currently 
Network Computers (NC) are being flagg~d as the next possible source for large 
consumption of PC-related technologies, bringing not only electronic commerce, but 
a whole range of computerized activities and entertainment, into the home living 
room. A whole range of new services will he provided via the Internet, connecting 
consumers and suppliers evermore closely in the global economy. 
One such service will be that of electronic strongboxes [1] as part of the larger elec-
tronic commerce infrastructure. We view the provision of electronic strongboxes as a 
natural progression from that of electronic trading in general. As the security of the 
Internet is further developed and standards for electronic commerce become stable 
and are reflected in secure implementation, we perceive that electronic strongboxes 
will become "just another service" deliverer! through and by the Internet. 
The concept of electronic strongboxes has ]wen derived from the similar notion found 
in the physical world. In the traditional financial sector the provision of strongboxes 
has been in service for sometime. Customers can apply to have a private strongbox 
held within a bank, in which the customer can place any type and any amount of 
valuables, subject only to the physical characteristics of the strongbox. The bank 
typically has no interest in the contents of the strongbox, and derives income from 
providing safe storage and access to such strongboxes. The identity of the strongbox 
customer and the fact itself of the customer having a strongbox are usually treated 
as confidential by the bank. 
The technology to implement secure electronic strongboxes is party available today. 
A large part of the protocols that can be employed can be derived from other systems 
in electronic commerce, which so far has focused mainly on payment systems. These 
proposed systems range from those which require an interface to the existing financial 
infrastructure (such as DigiCash [2, 3], iKP [4], NetBill [5] and SET [6]), to those 
which employ electronic coins/cash as a reusable payment mechanism circulating 
electronically (eg. NetCash/NetCheque [7, 8]). 
2 Electronic Strongboxes: Background 
Physical strongboxes have been employed ill the financial and other sectors for some-
time now. Banks often provide strongboxes for their customers, charging a certain fee 
for the safekeeping of the strongboxes. Typically, some form of identification - direct 
or indirect - is required before the bank allows the customer access to the box itself. 
The identification can be an actual identifying personal information (eg. driver's li-
cense), or it can be in the form of a token (eg. card or access-key) recognizable by 
the bank. The advantage of a token lies in the anonymity of the customer, which is 
a primary requirement for physical strongbox and electronic strongbox systems. 
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The requirement of anonymity is tied closely to that of privacy, and is accepted as part 
of the service provided by the bank or other strongbox providers. In the electronic 
realm, anonymity has been a major issue within electronic commerce dealing with 
monetary transactions. Like ordinary cash, electronic money should provide the basic 
features of the untraceability of payments, undeniability of payments (and receipts), 
and others. 
In the electronic strongbox concept, the anonymity of customers goes hand-in-hand 
with the need of secrecy with regards to the "electronic items" being stored in the 
strongbox. Like the bank, the electronic strongbox provider should not be interested 
in the contents of the strongboxes, but should derive income from providing a user-
friendly and secure strongbox service. \Vit.h the advent of browsers for the world-
wide-web, and the resulting interest in eledronic commerce, user-friendly interfaces 
can be created using existing secure browsers that have been implemented to handle 
electronic commerce and trading. 
Users of a strongbox-browser should be allowed to manipulate objects stored within 
the strongbox using an iconic object represelltation. These electronic objects or items 
can be certified representations of physical objects, and can include electronic coins or 
cash, electronic bank cheques, digital doculllents (eg. stocks and contracts), anony-
mous digital certificates of ownership of physical items, cryptographic material to 
access other services, and others. A custolller may have multiple strongboxes, each 
at differing strongbox providers. Using a unified interface, customers should be able 
to move items between strongboxes, each ullder different providers. 
A third party maybe appointed for such cases when disputes occur between an owner 
of a strongbox and the institution that maintains the strongbox. This may occur, 
for example, when a dishonest user claims tllat his or her access key has a matching 
strongbox within the bank, or when the ballk inappropriately denies access to a valid 
owner of strongbox. 
The provision of strongboxes on a global network such as the Internet should lead to 
an economy which is based not only on monetary transactions, but also on bader, 
or personal trade. As the exchange of items is a normal part of daily life, electronic 
strongboxes can be a medium within which to carry-out non-monetary commerce with 
privacy, confidentiality and user anonymity. Other institutions may act as valuers and 
conve1'ters where valuable items (eg. gold) are given a valuation and an electronic 
certificate for the item is provided. The sallie institution may also provide long-term 
safe storage for the physical items, whilst t.he anonymous owner uses the electronic 
certificate on the Internet. Such certificates should never be convertible to electronic 
coins or cash for payments, as they may present an opportunity for money laundering 
or similar activities that may have drastic iIllplications on the Internet-based economy. 
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Another way of approaching the electronic strongbox concept is that of seeing the 
strongboxes as a kind of secure public storage medium. Items belonging to a user 
can be dispersed throughout the Internet ill a transparent manner. Users should not 
be concerned with the underlying management of the strongboxes. However, they 
should receive a high level of assurance that the contents of the strongbox will not be 
visible to other people and that the items will not be stolen. 
The early work by Brandt et al [9] points to the benefits of anonymous and ver-
ifiable database, particularly in the context of privacy against government bodies 
that wish to cross-correlate data belonging to individuals in society. In [9] the true 
identity of each individual remains unknowll and the individual employed a different 
pseudonym [10] when dealing with each government body or institution. The main 
feature of the work was that each individual must also have the ability to verify that 
his or her personal details held by an institlltion are correct. Further work has also 
been reported in [11]. 
However, one underlying difference betweell the anonymous/verifiable database and 
the public strongbox concept is the privacy of data. In the anonymous/verifiable 
database, it is intended that the institution that maintains the database view the 
data belonging to the users, whilst at the same time maintaining the anonymity of 
the users. The users can then verify that t.he database contains correct data about 
the user (eg. patient record in a hospital system). In contrast, in the public strongbox 
concept the contents of the strongbox must remain confidential, with the users still 
remaining anonymous and being able to verify the contents of the strongbox. 
3 Strongbox Systems: Basic Components 
Figure 1 illustrates a simple design for a strollgbox system, borrowing the terminology 
from the area of electronic payment systems. All electronic interactions between par-
ticipants are assumed to be over a secure channel, with peer authentication conducted 
at the commencement of communications. The proposed system of Figure 1 does not 
pretend to be comprehensive, and it attempts only to address themain components 
only. Additional components will be required to support the framework to achieve 
full workability. 
The participants of the system are as follows: 
• Customer: the customer or user, interacting with the Strongbox Provider (eg. 
Bank) for the safekeeping of electronic items . 
• Strongbox Providel': an institution that provides the electronic strongbox service 
to a customer, accepting the storage a.nd retrieval of electronic items to/from 
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Figure 1: An Electronic Strongbox System 
the electronic strongboxes. 
• Value1': the on-line Valuer is trusted to verify that an electronic item belonging 
to an owner (ie. Customer) truly exists and has not been modified by its current 
owner. The Valuer can also be requested to split items into several sub-items, 
and issue certificates for them. Several Valuers may exist on-line, and each must 
recognize the other's certification. 
• Exchange Facilitator: the Exchange Facilitator aids two or more Customers 
who wish to exchange items from their strongboxes. The Facilitator can be a 
Strongbox Provider and is under the jurisdiction of the Association. 
• Association: the Strongbox Providers and the Valuer work under the umbrella 
of the Association. Customers bring disputes to the Association. 
In addition, there are the Physical Value1' aud the Notary which are in the physical 
world and interfaced to the electronic world. The Physical Valuer should be distinct 
from the on-line Valuer as the Physical Valuer knows what a physical item is and 
which pseudonym forwarded the physical it.em to be valued. The Physical Valuer 
stores the physical items at the Secure Physical Storage, to which the Association has 
access in the case of disputes. The Notary comes in on behalf of a Customer when 
disputes necessitates their presence 1. 
lIn the remainder of this paper, unless otherwise stated, the term "Valuer" will refer to the 
on-line Valuer (as opposed to the Physical Valuer). 
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The Customer is the owner of the contents of a strongbox and is deemed also as 
the owner of the strongbox. The Customer must first join the strongbox system 
by opening an account with the Strongbox Provider, which can be a Bank or other 
institutions having the necessary computer illfrastructure to provide this service. The 
Customer obtains membership through tlw Association which issues the Customer 
with the credentials (eg. within a smartcard) and with a pseudonym to be used 
within the system. The Customer henceforth employs this pseudonym when using 
the system. 
4 Design and Security Issues 
4.1 Representation of Electronic Items 
The representation of items electronically can take two forms, bearing in mind the 
needs of the items to be valued or exchanged: 
• Item Certificate: this is the electronic item itself in the shape of an unforgeable 
certificate and having a one-to-one correspondence with the physical item. The 
Item Certificate carries the signature of the Physical Valuer and is co-signed by 
an on-line Valuer. 
• Description Certificate: this is a certificate guaranteeing that a given item exists 
somewhere in the system. The certificate may contain a digest or hash of the 
Item Certificate, and is signed by the Oil-line Valuer. The certificate may contain 
the pseudonym of the current owner. 
The two certificates are inseparable and should be stored in the strongboxes. The aim 
of having a Description Certificate is to allow one Customer to prove its ownership to 
another Customer before an exchange occurs. During an exchange, both certificates 
are handed-over as an item unit. 
The concept is derived from the idea of certified photocopies of important documents 
(eg. passports) which are often required for government and legal purposes. Peri-
odically the Description Certificate must be renewed by way of the Item Certificate 
being reconfirmed by the on-line Valuer. 
Similar to electronic cash, some form of serial numbering may be applied to all elec-
tronic items system-wide, to prevent illegal copying of certified items by its current 
owner. This must be done with the precaution that the serial numbers do not become 
way to trace the movement of items [12]. 
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Upon an exchange between two Customers the Exchange Facilitator may request 
an on-line Valuer to re-certify electronic items as belonging to their new owners 
respectively. For each electronic item, both the Item Certificate and the Description 
Certificate must be signed by the on-line Valuer. The Description Certificate will 
then contain the pseudonym of the new OWller of the corresponding item. 
Note that no identity information, such as the pseudonym, is mentioned anywhere 
within the Item Certificate. Thus, the current owner of the Item Certificate may at 
any time obtain the actual physical item by presenting the Item Certificate to the 
Physical Valuer. The physical Valuer must then inform the on-line Valuer of the 
removal of the item from circulation withill the electronic world. 
4.2 Strongboxes 
Bearing in mind that electronic items take the form of certificates, a strongbox can 
implemented by an organized enciphering the collection of (indexed) certificates be-
10llging to the Customer. Two general approaches to accessing strongboxes can be 
followed depending on the level of trust accorded by the Customer to the Provider: 
• Strongbox access by the Customer. H{'re it is the Customer that enciphers and 
deciphers the string corresponding to the strongbox. When a Customer presents 
his/her identifier during the authentication process, the Provider simply passes 
the Customer his/her strongbox via tlte secure channel. The Customer "opens" 
(deciphers) the strongbox using the secret key known to the Customer alone, 
and either inserts or removes items from the overall collection. 
If each individual item in the strongbox is also enciphered, a Customer should 
first extract an index of items stored in a particular strongbox. Only then 
should the Customer insert/remove specific items . 
• Strongbox access by the Provider on behalf of the Customer. If the Customer 
trusts the Provider, the Customer call relegate the task of opening/closing the 
strongbox to the Provider. Using th(' secure channel the Provider can deliver 
the index of items to the Customer, from which the Customer can select items 
or insert new items. 
Notice here that this is equivalent to the Provider having the access key to a 
Customer's strongbox and having the capacity to alter the strongbox contents. 
Although this approach has more risks, some methods to limits such risks can 
be employed. Thus, for example, the Provider can give a copy of the strongbox 
index which is signed by the Provider. The index can be given both at the 
opening and closing of a strongbox. lIence, using this index the Customer can 
challenge the Provider, should some items go missing from the strongbox. 
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In practice a Customer may insert any data string into a strongbox, subject only to 
storage space on the part of the Provider. However, such data strings will not have 
been certified by any Valuer, and thus would not be usable in any legal (disputable) 
exchanges. 
There are a number of further requirements that must be fulfilled by any strongbox 
system. Some of these are derived from concept in electronic payment systems in 
general, while some are specific to electronic strongboxes: 
• Privacy of strongbox contents. As in the case of physical strongboxes, the con-
tents of the strongbox should remain undisclosed to all parties except the key 
holder opening it using a valid key. Any system implementing the strongbox 
should ensure that the institution providing the service does not have back-
door or other hidden channels to access or view the contents of the electronic 
strongbox. 
In the physical world, some level of trust exists between the bank and strong-
box owner, whereby the owner relies on the bank not to place hidden cameras 
designed to view the strongbox contents and that the bank will not tamper 
with the strongbox. Ideally, such trust should also exist between a customer 
and the strongbox provider, similar to the level of trust between merchant and 
acquirer [4, 6]. 
• Privacy of strongbox locations. A user may have multiple strongboxes scattered 
all over the Internet under different guarding institutions. The locations of these 
strongboxes should be private information, available only to the owner (or any 
other delegated user) and the respective institutions. 
• Access to st'rongbox only by key holde,.. The institution must without exception 
provide access to the strongbox only to the key holder that presents a valid 
key. A security mechanism must be pmployecl to provide at least two levels of 
verification, namely at the point of reqnest for access to the strongbox, and later 
at the point of the opening strongboxes. These two levels can be implemented 
cryptographically, and should eliminate possibilities of procedural errors. 
• Storage of a variety of electronic items. A strongbox should be able to store 
a variety of digital items, subject only to the agreed storage space limitations. 
Even such limitations should be easily and immediately negotiable when a user 
reaches his or her storage limit, as t.he price for secondary storage continues 
to drop. System parameters that protect the strongboxes must be maintained 
under secure and tamper-free storage at the institution. 
• Items exchangeable between strongboXfs. Analogous to the physical counterpart, 
electronic strongboxes must allow for the exchange of items between two (or 
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more) strongboxes. Strongboxes may belong to the same owner, or they may 
belong to different owners who are working together. 
• Untraceability of moved items. Since the contents of strongboxes must remain 
private, moved items must then be untraceable. Untraceability should hold 
regardless of how many times an itelll has been moved between strongboxes, 
and regardless whether or not the itelll finds its way into a strongbox within 
which it previously resided. That is, a strongbox shouldllot have a "memory" 
of its previous contents. 
• Strongbox key can be delegated. Similar to the physical strongboxes, any person 
carrying the appropriate key must be able to open the box. Ideally strongboxes 
should even allow stolen keys to be llsed, as the issue of protecting keys is 
separate from user anonymity. 
In electronic strongboxes, delegation must be provided, whereby an owner of 
the strongbox can delegate another user to become a key holder to access the 
owner's strongbox. Both users must remain anonymous. At the same time, 
delegation schemes must have a limi tcd lifetime or the ability to be revoked by 
the owner [13]. 
Single-use keys may provide a solutioll. in which delegated keys are derived from 
the original key, and where the bank holding the strongbox are aware of a key 
being a derivative, and would allow only one-off access to a given strongbox. 
Multiple-use keys may also be devised, using technology similar to electronic 
coins. Every usage of the key would reduce its worthiness, until it is diminished 
when it reaches its maximum number of usages. 
• Strongboxes movable to othel' institutions. Strongboxes must be movable be-
tween institutions, similar to the way electronic cash or coins are movable 
around the Internet. An owner of a strongbox must be able either to move 
the entire strongbox without opening it, or to shift the contents of one strong-
box at one institution to another stro1lgbox under a different institution. Both 
alternatives are attractive, and both should be available to the user, depending 
on the user's circumstances. Security, privacy and anonymity must be ensured 
in both cases. 
4.3 Strongbox Providers 
Similar to financial institutions in electronic payment systems, Strongbox Providers 
face a range of possible functional and security failures that may affect the reputa-
tion of the Provider. However, unlike Internet-based cash or payment systems, the 
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Figure 2: Check-in and check-out of electronic strongboxes 
scenario for fraud by the Customers (or by a Provider) are somewhat reduced. Once 
a strongbox is checked-in, the responsibility against any fraud lies at the door of the 
Provider. Thus, there are some basic req1lirements which must be satisfied for the 
secure working of a strongbox system: 
• Proof of the 1'etrieval of a strongbox. The Provider must have some form of proof 
that a strongbox is currently being "cllecked-out" (Figure 2). That is, that the 
strongbox has been retrieved and is currently in the possession of the Customer. 
This is to prevent the Customer from claiming otherwise and therefore forcing 
the Provider to take account of loss('s. This notion is similar to that of the 
forging of electronic cash or coins, or to that of denying that payments have or 
have not been made. 
The retrieve and store operations must exhibit the typical transaction properties 
of atomicity, consistency, isolation and durability [14, 15]. 
A further aspect that must be taken iB10 consideration is the allowable length of 
time for a strongbox to be held (checked-out) by its owner and the implications 
on security. Given that a Customer typically knows the contents of his or 
her strongbox - either from human memory or through a list stored securely 
(eg. smartcard) - it is reasonable to assume that the check-out and check-in 
should occur within the span of a single transaction. The notion of time here is 
again similar to that found in electronic payment schemes, in which a merchant 
expects some level of immediacy in the payment by a customer. 
• Verification of access key to the strongbox. Before providing a key holder with 
access to the claimed strongbox, the Provider must have sufficient proof that 
the requester (ie. owner or their delf'gate) is a valid party within the system. 
That is, the requester has a valid pseudonym and can be authenticated. The 
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Provider must also verify that the key is a recognized and valid key. 
One potential problem would be the possibility of the illegal duplication of access 
information. That is, the potential t.hat more than one access key exists at 
any time. Current technology can soh-e this problem either through smartcard 
systems or through the provision of a single-use access keys for the strongboxes. 
In the later case, a new access key needs to be generated each time a strongbox 
is retrieved and stored. 
An interesting notion is that of having backups for strongboxes. In accordance with 
previous requirements and the norms found i tl physical strongbox systems, a Provider 
does not know the contents of a given strollgbox (nor the value of the items in it). 
To safeguard the Provider from any damaging claims by a Customer, two possible 
solutions can be employed: 
• The two parties can agree upon an upper limit in monetary terms of the possible 
claims made against the Provider by a Customer. This is similar to insurance 
against losses. 
• The Provider can make a backup of a strongbox immediately before a strongbox 
is released upon a check-out request hy a Customer. Should a Customer com-
plain or should there be some protocol failure leading to the loss or corruption 
of the strongbox, the Provider can bring the backup copy on-line. 
Note that additional means should be used to ensure that a Provider does not 
make illegal copies of strongboxes and that only a single strongbox is ever valid 
on the system. 
To prove the authenticity of that single strongbox copy, a hash of the concate-
nation of the Strongbox and the previous Receipt (previously issued when the 
Customer last checked-in his/her strongbox) can be created by the Provider 
and delivered to some third party (eg. notary) with an attached lifetime. 
4.4 Customers 
From the Customer's point of view the Provider is the best point of attack both from 
external attacker and from within the Pro,-ider institutions itself. Thus, there are a 
number of requirements that need to be satisfied: 
• Anonymity of owner'. The owner must remain anonymous, and the fact that 
she or he owns a strongbox must also remain a private fact. Methods to create 
pseudonyms exist in other forms of electronic commerce which can be used in 
the strongbox case. 
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• Anonymity of key holder. The key holder is the user that presents a valid key 
to the Provider to access a strongbox held by the Provider. The Provider has 
the right to verify that the key fits into one of its strongboxes, and to deny 
access if the verification fails. Depending on the system, this must be without 
the Customer necessarily revealing the actual key (eg. zero-knowledge-based 
solutions). The key holder can be the owner of the strongbox, or any other user 
delegated to access the strongbox by its owner. 
• Unauthorized retrieval of strongbo:r is impossible. A Customer must have the 
assurance that the unauthorized checking-out of his or her strongbox is impos-
sible. Unlike electronic cash, electronic items which are stolen cannot be easily 
replaced as the items may have been (~xchanged through a number of hands. 
A possible safe-guard can be implemented at the physical end, when Customers 
convert their electronic items back in! 0 physical items currently being stored in 
the secure physical storage. Even theil, disputes may occur between the current 
holder of the electronic item and thos(~ who claim that it was stolen from them. 
• Proof of storage by the Provider. A Customer requires some proof in the form 
of a receipt that his or her strongbox has been correctly checked-in and that the 
Provider now holds the strongbox. 
• Proof of valuation. \\Then an item undergoes valuation or when an item is split 
by the Valuer into several electronic sub-items, a Customer owning the item (and 
thus sub-items) requires proof in the form of the certification of the item (sub-
items). Clearly the Valuer itself must. be a certified one and be authenticated 
by the Customer before any valuatioll transaction occur. 
• Proof of exchange transaction. Whell a Customer carries-out an exchange of 
items with another Customer via the Exchange Facilitator, both Customers 
must have sufficient proof that the exchange occurred correctly in such a way 
that neither party can deny the transaction. 
4.5 On-Line Valuers 
In order to bring an item into the system tll<~ Customer must first obtain a valuation 
of the physical item to the Physical Valuer. The Physical Valuer issues the Customer 
with a digital certificate corresponding to the physical item. This certificate is rec-
ognized and accepted by all participants ill the system. The actual physical item 
itself is then stored in the Secure Physical Storage, under the control of either the 
physical Valuer or of the Association. Any Customer presenting an electronic certifi-
cate for a physical item can obtain the item from the Physical Valuer or through the 
Association. 
1:2 
The unit of the physical item to be valued alld certified must be agreed upon between 
the Customer and the Physical Valuer (eg. six bars of gold can be written under 
one certificate, or six certificates can be produced corresponding to the six physical 
items). Having small units for the valuation allows for easier usage of the items at 
a later date. However, should a Customer wish to break-up an electronic item into 
several reasonable components - bearing ill mind the physical reality of the item -
the Customer can approach the on-line Valuer to obtain such services. 
Qllce within the system the certificate is referred to as an electronic item. vVhat the 
item is and who holds the item presently 1lI1lst remain confidential. A Customer can 
store the electronic item with any Strongbox Provider, assuming he or she already 
has a strongbox account with them. 
For each valued item and valuation result it is important that the Valuer obtains 
proof of receipt from the Customer. This is to prevent a Customer accusing the 
on-line Valuer of stealing an item submitted [or valuation. 
4.6 Exchange Facilitator 
vVhen two or more Customers have agreed to exchange items, they can carry-out 
the exchange of the corresponding electronic items through the Exchange Facilitator 
(Figure 3). Ideally, before an exchange occurs, the Customers should prove the pos-
session of the items to each other. This call be done via the Desc7'iption Certificate 
which contains the pseudonym of the owner and which has been signed by a Valuer. 
I Customer I Strongbox Provider I I Exchange Facilitator I 
Request 
Strongbox check-out ~ ~E------=---------___ 




Item for exchange I 
--------------------~--------------~~~ .. , 
I 
~:,E 





Figure 3: Exchange of electronic items 
However, even without such pre-exchange confirmation of possession, the Exchange 
Facilitator must be able to ensure that no cheating occurs. The Facilitator must 
inform each Customer as to the electronic items it has received for the exchange 
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instance (to prevent cheating), and the Facilitator must also provide a guarantee of 
non-repudiation should one (or both) Customer dispute the exchange. The Facilitator 
can be a trusted third party, or it can be Olle of the Strongbox Providers selected by 
both Customers. 
The use of the Exchange Facilitator is optiollal. Customers can perform any exchange 
of items directly among themselves, through a secure channel. However, without the 
Exchange Facilitator disputes cannot be resolved and the burden of risks lie fully with 
the Customers. 
Corresponding to the proofs required by a Customer for the exchange of an item, 
the Facilitator requires proof of the submission of the items to be exchanged, and 
more importantly proof of the delivery and receipt of the items after the exchange. 
This proof must come from all involved Customers, and serves as protection for the 
Facilitator against false claims by the Customers. 
5 Remarks and Conclusion 
In this paper we have briefly discussed the issues for the design of a secure electronic 
strongbox system for the Internet. The hasic components and requirements of a 
strongbox system has been presented, focusing only on the main components of the 
system, namely the Customer, Strongbox Provider, the Valuers and the Exchange 
Facilitator. This effort does not pretend to he comprehensive, as there are a number 
of issues that remain to be resolved in the wider context of electronic commerce, and 
also within the specific scope of electronic strongboxes. 
Further work will follow in defining precise terms and the protocols for the strongbox 
system. In addition, further investigation must be carried-out into the sui tabili ty 
of some of the components implementing electronic commerce for use in strongbox 
systems. This should lead to a seamless illtegration of strongbox systems into the 
larger infrastructure for electronic commerce. This would further allow strongbox 
systems to eventually be viewed a simply a service given through and by the Internet. 
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